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In Art as Experience, Dewey claims that “‘imagination’ shares with ‘beauty’ the doubt-
ful honor of being the chief theme in esthetic writings of enthusiastic ignorance. 
More perhaps than any other phase of the human contribution, it has been treated 
as a special and self-contained faculty, differing from others in possession of mys-
terious potencies.”1 Despite this “doubtful honor,” or as some might claim, because 
of it, imagination seems to have become a matter of unquestionable value in educa-
tional rhetoric over the last half-century.2 This value is doubtless due in part to the 
immeasurable influence of Maxine Greene’s understanding of aesthetic education on 
broad swaths of educational thought.3 Yet Greene’s influence can itself be traced to its 
place in a zeitgeist that comprises at least two other important trends related to the 
power of the image, providing her aesthetic-social theory with a fertile environment 
in which to flourish. One of these trends is an emphasis on including and celebrating 
diversity as a means to a vision of society that has yet to be realized or codified and 
therefore necessitates the imaginative breaks that Greene’s ideas require. After the 
Brown v. Board Supreme Court decision, America came to see education as a scene 
of practical application in the Civil Rights movement—a place where the difficult task 
of realizing the democratic promise inherent in America’s laws might be undertaken 
without failing under the weight of deeply embedded social norms. The classroom 
has become the ever-open site where progressive idealism might claim children’s 
imaginations on behalf of a radically changing picture of what counts as human. 
The second of these trends is a repeated skepticism about the discursive work-
ings of power and a shift in emphasis in some scholarly work on education to non-
discursive elements of human experience. This backlash against both structuralist 
social sciences and analytic philosophy drives educational studies toward a greater 
interest in existential experience, the extra-linguistic, affect, idiocy, suffering, and 
the abject. Within this trend, the irrational, unthought, unrepresented aspects 
of the human being operate on two distinct levels. On the one hand, educational 
theorists draw our attention to those elements of our shared humanity that our 
discursive practices obscure and marginalize in order to exclude what cannot be 
explained without putting the discourse itself into question. On the other hand, the 
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marginalized, extra-discursive position serves as a novel, if contingent, perspective 
from which to launch critical attacks upon the status quo. 
Joined with these allied trends, imagination can be seen as a means to liberate 
subjectivity from the particularity of its constructed, discursive nature through the 
presence of an “other” who offers the possibility of change for both the individual 
subject and the discourses to which she is subject. If the goal is progressive growth, 
achievable only through the ritual breaking of those beliefs and values that shape 
the way we see the world, imagination seems to provide the means, allowing us to 
see the limits of our existing discourses and the possibilities inherent therein. While 
this story of progressive growth and the possibility of social progress by means of 
critical breaks with the past is by far the greater theme in Greene’s work, I argue 
here that her writings also maintain a second, less developed or perhaps simply less 
influential theme, namely, that of imagination as an integrating and coordinating 
action upon a diversely populated environment and a disjointed feeling of selfhood.
The problem with this second concept of imagination in Greene’s work is that, 
if it is taken together with the first, these two ideas provide a seemingly paradoxi-
cal definition of imagination, particularly in its educational applications. In short, 
this compound definition would seem to state that imagination is both that which 
disrupts and undermines my established sense of selfhood by presenting incom-
prehensible alternatives and that which provides the sense of narrative continuity 
essential for establishing a stable sense of selfhood. By acknowledging the first, more 
influential theme that aligns imagination, critical thought, and social change, the 
aim of this essay is to make sense of the second theme, that of imagination as an 
integrating and coordinating aspect of human experience. By giving our attention to 
this second theme, I argue neither that the apparent contradiction between the two 
themes falls away nor that we can find some comfortable middle ground between 
the two. Instead, I argue that the characteristics allowing imagination to operate in 
both of these contradictory directions also undergirds educational scholars’ con-
temporary faith in aesthetic education as that which has the power to change both 
individuals and society in a way that discursive practices cannot, precisely because 
imagination’s role in coordinating and shoring up our ideas of selfhood means that 
images can also threaten that same sense of selfhood in ways that words cannot. 
Through Plato’s critique of poetic images as a moral curriculum, Lacan’s theorization 
of the mirror stage, and through these authors’ overlapping theories of the origins 
of desire in the human subject through the power of the imaginary, I consider how 
the image serves as both the subject’s entry point into the world of human com-
munity and as the means by which one’s relationship to discursive norms might be 
overcome, or at least upset. On the one hand, unfamiliar, yet compelling and seem-
ingly complete images may provide the subject with new desires of what it wants to 
be. On the other hand, disturbingly familiar images may suggest to the subject the 
untenability of its relationship to the world.
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incomplEtEnESS, imagination, and frEEdom
In the last half century, educational theorists have adopted a critical stance and 
taken on a task of unveiling the economies of power that drive schooling, despite 
the themes of hope and goodwill typically invoked in educational rhetoric. Cit-
ing discursive power as one of the means by which oppressive power in schools 
is maintained, many theorists look to extra-linguistic sources—from the somatic 
and violent to the affective and artistic—upon which resistance or rebellion against 
oppressive educational discourses might gain a foothold. In her 1995 collection of 
essays Releasing the Imagination, Maxine Greene aligns herself with the radical 
educational critique of her time by telling of her “feeling of loss, after civil rights, 
of what we are doing.”4 Like Arendt’s example of the partisan fighter who returns 
to peaceful times to find his purpose in the world lost, and uneasy with postmod-
ernism’s failure to produce meaningful political courses of action, Greene’s words 
reflect a fear that education will be turned over to the functionaries and clerks of 
the world, who will keep account of schooling processes without ever question-
ing what it is that we do when we teach, and who may drive great teachers away 
from the practice altogether while preventing the minds of future generations 
from achieving the “wide awakeness” that characterizes her ethical perspective. A 
similar formulation of the opposition between imagination and discursive power 
appears in The Dialectic of Freedom:  “A concern for the critical and imaginative, 
for the opening of new ways of ‘looking at things,’ is wholly at odds with the tech-
nicist and behaviorist emphases we still find in American schools. It represents a 
challenge, not yet met, to the hollow formulations, the mystifications so charac-
teristic of our time.”5 In aligning her views on imagination with a critical social 
philosophy, Greene responds to a more conservative interpretation of the received 
wisdom of schooling as conscious social reproduction with a flat rejection: “it is 
simply not enough for us to reproduce the way things are.”6 Instead, she argues, 
according to a rhetoric that has become commonly accepted among educational 
theorists, that schools must also be places where radical difference is possible, and 
where social change begins in the ability to see things as if they could be otherwise. 
Within this vision of schools as sites of social change, imagination serves as the 
human faculty capable of contending with the unfamiliar that might offer a more 
democratic alternative to the status quo. As Greene quotes Sartre, our ability to 
imagine another, better state of affairs, or being-as-otherwise, provides the push 
away from the social woes we have come to take for granted: “it is on the day that 
we can conceive of a different state of affairs that a new light falls on our troubles 
and our suffering and that we decide that these are unbearable.”7
Greene’s idea of imagination as a function of human freedom, as that which 
opens human beings to a broader range of possibilities, is expressed in her title 
Releasing the Imagination, in which imagination is invoked as a bird or other wild 
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creature that might be freed from its captivity within oppressive structures of social 
constraint and narrow thinking, and take on its natural expression and activity in 
the spiritual production of the new. Her understanding of the work of schools seems 
directly tied to this goal of release: “teaching and learning are matters of breaking 
through barriers–of expectation, of boredom, of predefinition,” and she suggests 
that the problems commonly associated with schools, such as “apathy and indif-
ference are likely to give way as images of what might be arise.”8
Greene’s influence on educational theory presents itself in our often unac-
knowledged assumption that schools promote greater freedom and democracy 
when they inspire students to imaginatively move beyond their existing under-
standings of the world. Recently, under the pressing need to understand greater 
cultural diversity in public schools, this venturing out into the unknown has been 
given voice in the question of how the subject is challenged by and might learn 
through its interactions with otherness. This understanding of imagination dislo-
cates the agency of change from the teacher or student as imagining subject or image 
maker to a radical form of otherness that cannot be defined or even anticipated in 
advance of its arrival. In an essay that highlights the subject’s dependence on the 
unknown for its capacity to deliver a new experience, Claudia Ruitenberg quotes 
John Caputo on the subject of radical otherness: “how to prepare for one whom 
the only adequate preparation is to confess that we cannot be prepared for what is 
coming?”9 Caputo’s question, and Ruitenberg’s analysis that follows it, suggest a 
great degree of stability in the subject who is willing to allow herself to be destabi-
lized, who can feel secure despite the discomfort of a “hot potato in our mouth”—a 
metaphor Ruitenberg uses to illustrate images of difference that cannot be reduced 
to variations on sameness.10
The fixed, stable worldview destabilized in Ruitenberg’s account of the edu-
cational subject, whose capacity for imagining the new and experiencing some 
sort of freedom has been closed in upon itself, delivers only variations on exist-
ing themes, and requires the intrusion of the other for its continued growth and 
renewal. But precisely because the subject of this disruptive education seems—as 
in Greene’s work that informs it—already formed by its experiences, the role of the 
image as a liberator from the “cotton-wool” of everyday experience begs the ques-
tion of how the subject becomes invested in that series of fixed images from which 
its education later provides extrication. As the ideals of class, cultural, or national 
identity that Greene describes as limitations to freedom originate from the social 
rather than the natural realm, the subject’s entanglement in these ideals must also 
originate from its education in a curriculum of images.
Greene’s account of the education of imagination would seem narrowly 
capricious if it proceeded by employing one set of images deemed “emancipatory” 
to counteract the negative characteristics of another collection of images deemed 
“oppressive.” But her treatment of imagination suggests that she recognizes the 
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paradoxical possibilities that arise out of the inherently ambivalent nature of 
images. While the major theme of Greene’s essays on imagination undoubt-
edly follows the trend of imagination as a key to change and reform discussed 
above, a second theme that runs throughout her work concerns the relationship 
between identity and the image and suggests that imagination grounds and 
extends human identity over time rather than fracturing the subject in an end-
less flow of difference.
Greene provides a connection between image and identity from the very out-
set of Releasing the Imagination, whereby she connects the role of imagination with 
Charles Taylor’s idea of a quest as an organizing principle for a human life. Greene 
closes this first essay with a similar statement regarding the significance of some 
stable sense of self, namely, that as humans our “‘fundamental anxiety’ is that we 
will pass through the world and leave no mark.”11 These refrains establish an idea of 
imagination that releases the beholder from the constraints of the status quo only 
at the cost of subscribing to yet another way of seeing the world that organizes the 
subject’s purposes as an effect of its power of presentation.
These two seemingly oppositional functions of the imagination—integration 
and disintegration—run throughout Greene’s work, and, perhaps due to her influ-
ence in educational research, the ambivalent character of the image is taken for 
granted in much of educational thought. Nor is the seemingly contradictory char-
acter of the image limited to its treatment in pedagogical theory. Greene quotes two 
theorists on the imagination whose work seems to demonstrate the same conflict 
in the role of imagination without highlighting that conflict as a problem. From 
Mary Warnock, Greene quotes the following: “[Imagination] is the way we render 
the world familiar and therefore manageable. At a different level, and sporadically, 
we may also use it to render our experience unfamiliar and mysterious. If, below 
the level of consciousness, our imagination is at work tidying up the chaos of sense 
experience, at a different level it may, as it were, untidy it again.”12 And from G. 
B. Madison, “It is through the imagination, the realm of pure possibility that we 
freely make ourselves to be who or what we are, that we creatively and imaginatively 
become who we are, while in the process of preserving the freedom and possibility 
to be yet otherwise than what we have become and merely are.”13 While Madison 
seems unaware of the contradiction, allowing imagination to do anything by tying 
its meaning down to nothing, Warnock seems completely aware of the contradictory 
nature of imagination, discriminating between its opposed functions by placing 
them “at a different level” from one another. This differentiation by level seems to 
be a step in the right direction, suggesting that human subjects might possess more 
than one kind of imagination or image making function, but Warnock does not 
pursue these alternate functions separately. In order to follow the differentiation 
suggested by Warnock, and to better understand how the imagination, as a single 
faculty, is capable of two seemingly opposed functions, in the next section I turn to 
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one of the most enduring frameworks for understanding the relationship between 
images, education, and human freedom, namely, Plato’s Republic.
imagination aS thE foundation of idEntity
Centuries of scholarship have misinterpreted Plato’s Republic, Books II and X, as 
an absolute statement of Plato’s negative views regarding poets and poetry, disre-
garding the hypothetical context in which Socrates’s censorship and banishment 
of poetry and the poets takes place. While a thorough analysis and refutation of 
these interpretations are beyond the scope of this paper, it should suffice to men-
tion some of the arguments that have been raised critiquing any simple account 
of the ancient feud between philosophy and poetry: that Plato himself was a poet, 
writing in a dialogic style of narrative particular to poets in his time; that Plato 
gives some poets of his time some of the most eloquent and memorable lines in 
his work and quotes the poets who preceded him with regularity and authority; 
that the noble lie upon which Plato establishes his hypothetical city consists just as 
much of poetic images as the works of Homer and Hesiod it replaces; and, perhaps 
most importantly with respect to the most damaging criticism of Plato’s thoughts 
on the poets, that in the Republic Plato is not prescribing an actual role for poets in 
a real city, but is demonstrating, through a complex, poetic metaphor, the possibil-
ity of achieving Adeimantus’s and Glaucon’s challenge: justice without the promise 
of reward or the threat of punishment.
The most significant feature of Plato’s critique of the poets in Book II of the 
Republic is that, in confronting particular poetic narratives from Homer and Hes-
iod as guides for the moral upbringing of the guardian class, Plato simultaneously 
recognizes the power and the threat of poetic images in grounding the moral edu-
cation of the guardian class and, through the myth of the metals, in organizing the 
imagined state itself (375a–377e).14 The threat that the poets pose to the state is not 
that their work is inherently flawed or necessarily corrupt, but that the poets fail 
to understand the generative character of the images they produce in shaping the 
morals of the young—a theme that is carried across Plato’s writings. According to 
the Ion, the poets understand neither their own processes of creation, nor the poetic 
effect that their creations might have on others, but are merely the passive media 
through which the divine speaks (533d–534c). In the Meno, Plato emphasizes the 
importance of “tethering” divinely revealed truths, such as those the poets reveal, 
through critical reasoning, so that their effects in the world will not be misplaced 
and produce effects that contradict the divine will (97d–98b). In the Symposium, 
Plato elaborates on the poets’ inability to exercise the critical capacity that would 
make their art useful, demonstrating the poets’ failure to understand the relation-
ship between the images they produce and the desires that these images, in turn, 
produce in their audience (194c, 205b).
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Plato’s construction of a moral and political curriculum of images in the 
Republic challenges us to understand the human subject’s relation to the images 
in which its identity is invested, the relationship between the imaginary and the 
subject’s desire to become like those images that attract through their beauty, per-
fection, or sublimity. In other words, if the image presents itself as a wholeness 
which the human subject finds itself lacking and thereby inspires desire in the 
beholder, then why do some images of completeness attract and others not? What 
is the basis for the subject’s relationship to the image? Plato answers these ques-
tions in the context of the Republic by describing children’s souls as similar to wet 
clay insofar as they receive whatever imprint is pressed upon them (377b), but only 
begins to provide a more complex account of the malleability of the human soul 
in the Symposium. In the latter text, in a play of completeness and incompleteness, 
Diotima describes poros (resource) and penia (poverty), as the parents of Eros. 
According to Diotima’s genealogy, desire emerges from the human subject’s pain-
ful awareness of her incompleteness or lack when faced with an image of wholeness 
(203b–d). Illustrated through Socrates’s brief dialogue with Agathon at the center 
of the text (199c–201d) and Alcibiades’s confession of love at the close of the text 
(215a–222c), the human subject does not experience desire on its own, but only as 
an effect of its desired object: an image of completeness in relation to which the 
subject feels her own lack.
For Plato, this means that the desiring subject’s identity is not entirely her 
own, but is experienced as an internalized negative of the image to which it is tied. 
While on the one hand desire awakens the subject to a more fundamental incom-
pleteness that marks human beings, on the other, desire is always experienced as a 
specific lack and in relation to a particular image of completeness.
The close relationship between desire and imagination in Plato returns 
throughout the history of Western philosophy as a theme of human self-creation, 
but it receives some of its most explicit treatment in the psychoanalytic work of 
Jacques Lacan. In an early essay, “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function 
of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,” Lacan describes the subject’s 
relation to the image by taking a borrowed discovery, that of the child’s recogni-
tion of its own reflection in the mirror from the age of six months, and positing 
this “mirror stage” as fundamental to the child’s “formation of the I,” as a human 
subject aware of its agency in a shared world.15 Unlike a developmental notion of 
a stage, the mirror stage is not a point that the subject passes through and com-
pletes, but serves instead as the subject’s initiation to the world of the imaginary—
the world conceived in terms of images—in which the subject’s identity remains 
invested throughout its life and outside of which it cannot make sense of itself or 
the world around it.
According to Lacan, the human infant initially experiences a series of dis-
connected, disorganized energies and internal as well as external perceptions, over 
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which it has neither control nor any organizing principle of a body or a bounded 
self that would allow it to understand these impulses and sensations as its own. The 
founding moment for a developing child’s experience of itself as a single entity—
bounded, individuated, and agentic—occurs in its first recognition that these sen-
sations all belong to a single body. In the case of the infant’s response to its own 
image, the mirror offers a promise of unity and integration—a “fictional direction” 
that contradicts the child’s fragmented experiences of herself, observed in the 
infant’s response in what Lacan calls “a flutter of jubilant activity,” a rush of physi-
cal excitement that, from the adult observer’s standpoint, we might misunderstand 
as an expression or externalization of a joy that the child experiences internally in 
knowing itself as a visually perceptible, bounded whole.16
According to Lacan’s schema, this notion of expressing an internal, pre-
existing feeling of the self is unfounded, as the child does not yet have a sense of 
itself as something recognizable. Instead of the outward movement of internally 
experienced emotion, Lacan posits the child’s recognition of itself in the mirror as 
a moment of initiation into the imaginary, in which the child’s internal sense of 
being a self, and the emotions that go with it, are impressed upon it by the visual 
image received from the mirror. “The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust 
is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation—and which manufactures for the 
subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies 
that extends from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality that I shall call 
orthopaedic—and lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, 
which will mark with its rigid structure the subject’s entire mental development.”17 
Through this first introduction and through subsequent experiences, the child 
comes to understand and experience itself through the mirror image’s promise of 
a unified and individuated being rather than merely an extension of its parent or 
as a fragmented body of uncontrollable movements and energies.
In contrast to those theorists of imagination in education who emphasize the 
place of the image in changing the subject through oppressive or liberatory ideals, 
Lacan’s account of the mirror stage suggests that participation in the imaginary 
produces the identity of the child in a manner that is neither oppressive nor libera-
tory, but constitutive. Just as Lacan’s idea of the fragmented body has its parallel in 
Greene’s recognition of our fundamental anxiety that in the end we will leave no mark 
on the world, the narrative endeavors in which Greene recognizes human attempts 
to overcome their fundamental anxiety can be seen as the work of employing the 
organizing power of the mirror image in providing the fantasy of an integrated self.
from SElf-intEgration to Social changE
If the imaginary founds and gives order to the subject through its projection of itself 
as an integrated, if incomplete, whole, we might still inquire about those theories of 
imagination in education in which the image appears as a catalyst of change. In order 
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to make sense of these two functions together, it is first necessary to understand how 
the image serves as a medium through which the subject comes to relate to others.
Through its initial recognition of its own potential as an agentic entity, Lacan 
claims that the child comes to view others as analogues of its own image and as fulfill-
ments of the mirror’s promise of an integrated selfhood. Recalling this same impulse 
of integrating and seeing order in the world in relation to oneself, Greene provides a 
poetic reflection on everyday experience: “One abruptly perceives willow trees, ‘all 
plumy and soft green and purple against the blue’ or one sees a connection between 
an apple tree and someone’s suicide, between a children’s quarrel and the darkness 
of the earth. At such times, one may be moved to ‘put the severed parts together, to 
impose some order or some meaning on it all.’”18 Establishing an initial, prediscursive 
order from an underlying confusion, the world of images also establishes relations with 
the world as it distinguishes the subject from its surroundings. Having ordered her 
own “severed parts” into a whole with the potential for meaning, the subject equally 
authorizes herself to order the world in terms of her own experience of it. According 
to Greene’s quotation of Wallace Stevens, “[The imagination] is part of our security. It 
enables us to live our own lives. We have it because we do not have enough without it. 
This may not be true as to each one of us, for certainly there are those for whom reality 
and reason are enough. It is true enough of the race.”19 Stevens’s quotation makes an 
important jump from the individual to the “race” and, in bringing imagination to the 
level of the social, provides the context wherein we may restate our question about the 
relationship between the two themes in Greene’s theory of imagination. If one set of 
images provides us with the sense of continuity and integrity necessary to pick up the 
task of our lives every day, how could we be willing to pick up another set of images 
tomorrow and completely reorient ourselves to the world? How can imagination do 
the work of social change if this involves undoing the coherence it helps to build?
Studies such as Deborah Britzman’s “Cultural Myths in the Making of Teach-
ers” and Mick Markham’s “Through the Looking Glass”—both of which focus on 
the power of the imaginary in shaping a teacher’s identity—suggest that disrupting 
longstanding imaginary attachments requires committed and sustained effort and 
may not be entirely attainable through the work of discourse. The change required 
by difficult images is so tied to our identity that we are often unable to give up our 
sustaining imaginary even for compelling reasons. Reasons, after all, are discursive, 
and often do not move us at the level of the imaginary, in which our attachments 
are tangentially connected to, and therefore largely immune to, ordinary operations 
of language. Faced with difficult images that threaten the way we see the world and 
our place in it, however, our discursive tools of critical analysis and questioning 
become a powerful means of inoculating ourselves against their subversive poten-
tial. Connecting an image to the discursive context that gives it meaning allows the 
subject to skate on a slippage of signifiers and endlessly detour from herself and the 
potential for damage experienced in the gaze of an unexpected or unwanted image. 
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The power of alternative images in changing our imaginary commitments con-
nects to what Dewey calls the image’s integrity and inevitability. Contrary to the posi-
tion quoted at the outset of this essay, Dewey seems to give in to the seduction of the 
imagination, conceding that “all conscious experience has of necessity some degree of 
imaginative quality,” and further claiming that imagination offers “a way of seeing and 
feeling things as they compose an integral whole . . . . When old and familiar things are 
made new in experience, there is imagination. When the new is created, the far and 
strange become the most natural inevitable things in the world.”20 The real potential 
for change to be made through images comes when the integral whole, the picture of 
one’s world that in turn provides an integral sense of self, comes together in a way that 
implicates the subject inescapably, offering her a realization of her own contingency 
or, more painfully, her culpability in a fundamentally unjust picture of the world.
Greene is aware of the difficulty at hand in being confronted by new images, 
and she seems to allow that there may be an effect that is neither wholesale rejection 
nor what Rorty would call cultural irony: “Aware, then, on some level of the integrity 
and the coherence of what may seem to us to be a totally alien world in the person 
of another, we are called upon to use our imaginations to enter into that world, to 
discover how it looks and feels from the vantage point of the person whose world it 
is . . . the extent to which we grasp another’s world depends on our existing ability 
to make poetic use of our imagination.”21 While it may be impossible, in any active 
sense, to imagine the world from another’s perspective, the point to which Greene 
seems to be driving here is that the image of the other, and the very impossibility of 
seeing through the other’s eyes conveyed by that image, may be enough to excite our 
desires, to disrupt our established sense of selfhood, and to use the extra-linguistic 
aspects of human experience to reshuffle the world of words as we know it.
In keeping with the decentering and destabilizing function of the image-
as-other that Ruitenberg identifies, the theme of identification with the image in 
Greene’s work may be qualified with the understanding that the identity offered by 
the image is never fully attainable, and serves to draw the subject out of itself rather 
than providing a solid place to arrive. Following the metaphor that Ruitenberg uses, 
the image may be experienced like a “hot potato in our mouth:” it may be held, but 
neither swallowed, digested, nor integrated in the subject’s erotic consuming of the 
other. Reversing that metaphor entirely, perhaps it is not the image or the object 
but the subject who is swallowed by, and becomes a part of, the world of images, 
insofar as its identity is invested and attached, held in tension between the various 
images through which it understands itself and which serve to impel it onward.
two functionS of thE imagination in hiStory
The Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s made extensive use of photo-
graphic and film images that are instantly recalled: the mangled face of Emmett 
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Till, the angry crowd following Elizabeth Eckford outside of Little Rock Central 
High School, police dogs unleashed on Birmingham protesters. Even as these images 
betray our sense of humanity and safety, they sit safely in a historical narrative 
of heroic overcoming and remarkable success. Despite their portrayal of horrific 
scenes, these black and white prints provide a sense of closure through their support 
of a narrative of political and social progress in America that suggests the hardest 
and most important battles have already been fought. For students studying the 
Civil Rights Movement in states outside of the South, the distance is not only tem-
poral but geographical and cultural, reinforcing a commonly held belief about the 
relative freedom of black people in the North during the time of Jim Crow laws in 
the South. The shock that these images produce can be experienced at a distance, 
reinforcing the relative justice of our contemporary social and political arrange-
ments, through questions such as: how could people live in such a way, witnessing 
the manner in which their fellow human beings suffered at the hands of an unjust 
and brutal political regime?
While American culture’s imaginary relationship to the Civil Rights Move-
ment serves the integrative, identity forming function described in Greene’s work, 
the doubled and paradoxical power of the imagination rests in the fact that similarly 
brutal images of institutional violence on black bodies, set in a different historical 
context, may play a role that not only fails to support Americans’ positive feelings 
about their progress toward racial equality but instead, echoing Greene’s quotation 
of Sartre, brings us to the point of realizing that the social and political conditions 
under which we live are unbearable. The nation’s new awareness of the oppression 
and brutality suffered by black people in America has been brought about largely 
by the work of eyewitnesses using cellphones as a means to bring objectivity to an 
otherwise hopelessly fragmented discourse on the connections between poverty, 
crime, and the policing of black communities in America. As the video footage 
of Eric Garner’s arrest has demonstrated, the significance of eyewitness images 
has had little to do with their capacity to establish an objective account of events. 
Instead, in similar fashion to the work of images during the Civil Rights Move-
ment, eyewitness phone camera footage has brought about visceral responses of 
shame, anger, and moral outrage.
A still from the video footage that captured the shooting of Walter Scott 
stands out from many of these images because of the simplicity and clarity of its 
aesthetic as well as the conflict it draws between its setting and the action that 
takes place within it. The vacant lot in which the scene is set is green and park-like. 
A large tree in the foreground divides the green field with a dark, uncertain blot, 
almost allowing the viewer to persist in a feeling of innocence that these must be 
two separate images. And yet the relation between the two figures on either side of 
the tree is unmistakable: to the right of the tree, a white man in dark clothes stands, 
pointing a handgun toward the left side of the image; on the left side of the tree, a 
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black man in a green sweatshirt and jeans runs with his shoulders thrust forward 
and his arms tucked close to his body. Informed by a litany of images from the Las-
caux cave paintings and Attic vase motifs to images of the American West captured 
by Remington and Kane, the image reads unmistakably as a hunting scene, one in 
which the horror of one person hunting another who flees for his life is depicted 
in the grainy, somewhat flat medium that we typically use to capture birthdays, 
school pageants, and other banal elements of our lives. 
Given the discussion above, we might imagine that in a century the image 
of Walter Scott’s shooting might serve as a point of historical reflection in a larger 
narrative of America’s growth and change, in the same way that the photograph of 
Emmett Till’s open casket and the story that goes with it have become part of the 
historical account of the country’s struggle toward racial equality. But the advent 
of this historical, socially integrative function for an image such as that of Walter 
Scott depends heavily on that image’s capacity to disrupt and undo whatever stable 
self-understanding Americans have allowed themselves through the integrative 
function of Civil Rights era images, turning our moralizing questions about how 
people could have lived as witnesses to inhuman oppression into questions about 
how it is possible to live under such conditions today. 
concluSion
The image, as that inchoate awareness of the world thought to precede clear ratio-
nal thinking, has served a problematic function in educational thought since Pla-
to’s Republic. Images serve as an aesthetic interface with the world, providing us 
with a palpable and credible sense of their immediacy and incontrovertibility. But 
precisely due to these claims of presence and self-evidence they may be rendered 
suspect through discursive functions of reflection or analysis. Plato expresses the 
urgency of curricular images as a problem of how developing human subjects come 
to understand themselves in relation to various expressions of human value. As 
children’s souls are like wet clay, taking any imprint that we put upon them while 
young, and bearing that imprint as the basis of their relation to the world, Plato’s 
Socrates argues that the traditional moral curriculum of epic poetry must be care-
fully censored in order to meet the pedagogical and political needs of the imagined 
city he discusses with Glaucon and Adeimantus (377b–e).
Even in this example, Plato demonstrates the inseparability of the two func-
tions of the imagination that have been identified in the present essay as a seemingly 
paradoxical pair: one to shore up and the other to tear down. In Plato’s thought 
experiment, censorship not only turns a critical, destructive eye toward the work 
of the past, erasing a cultural history for the sake of a carefully engineered ethics. 
In Socrates’s proposed collection of myths that displaces Homer’s and Hesiod’s a 
new poetic purpose is shaped, constituting new forms of subjectivity that would 
not be possible within the discursive horizon that Socrates’s interlocutors took for 
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granted. Conversely, the idea of engaging in a critical look at the past, of breaking 
with the constituting images that have come before us without at least implicitly 
offering new images of our own, is simply unthinkable. In the absence of any explic-
itly new founding narrative, the critic herself and the act of unveiling the myths of 
history become the new images because, at least according to the aesthetic and social 
philosophies of Plato and Greene, there is no such thing as human access to brute 
reality that is unmediated by some human, and therefore flawed, idea of the world.
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